Floodlight Quantum Key Distribution: A Practical Route to Gbps
  Secret-Key Rates by Zhuang, Quntao et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
51
0.
08
73
7v
5 
 [q
ua
nt-
ph
]  
7 J
ul 
20
16
Floodlight quantum key distribution: A practical route to Gbps secret-key rates
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The channel loss incurred in long-distance transmission places a significant burden on quantum
key distribution (QKD) systems: they must defeat a passive eavesdropper who detects all the light
lost in the quantum channel and does so without disturbing the light that reaches the intended
destination. The current QKD implementation with the highest long-distance secret-key rate meets
this challenge by transmitting no more than one photon per bit [Opt. Express 21, 24550–24565
(2013)]. As a result, it cannot achieve the Gbps secret-key rate needed for one-time pad encryption
of large data files unless an impractically large amount of multiplexing is employed. We introduce
floodlight QKD (FL-QKD), which floods the quantum channel with a high number of photons per
bit distributed over a much greater number of optical modes. FL-QKD offers security against the
optimum frequency-domain collective attack by transmitting less than one photon per mode and
using photon-coincidence channel monitoring, and it is completely immune to passive eavesdropping.
More importantly, FL-QKD is capable of a 2Gbps secret-key rate over a 50 km fiber link, without
any multiplexing, using available equipment, i.e., no new technology need be developed. FL-QKD
achieves this extraordinary secret-key rate by virtue of its unprecedented secret-key efficiency, in
bits per channel use, which exceeds those of state-of-the-art systems by two orders of magnitude.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Hk, 03.67.Dd, 42.50.Lc
I. INTRODUCTION
One-time pad (OTP) encryption provides information-
theoretically secure message transmission [1], but key
distribution is its Achilles’ heel. Quantum key distri-
bution (QKD) permits remote parties (Alice and Bob)
to share a random bit string—the key needed for OTP
encryption—with security vouchsafed by quantum me-
chanics [2–5]. Unfortunately, the demonstrated secret-
key rates of long-distance QKD systems fall far short
of the Gbps rates needed for OTP encryption of large
data files, as seen from the following state-of-the-art
achievements. In discrete-variable QKD (DV-QKD), the
best result to date is Lucamarini et al.’s decoy state
Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) system, which used a
1Gbps source rate but only realized a 1Mbps secret-key
rate over a 50-km-long fiber [6]. In continuous-variable
QKD (CV-QKD), the best result to date is from Huang et
al., who reported a 1Mbps secret-key rate at 25 km path
length using a 50Mbaud source rate [7], with 90 kbps ex-
pected at 50 km in the asymptotic (infinite block-length)
regime.
Focusing, for the moment, on DV-QKD systems—
owing to their greater demonstrated capability over long
distances—it is easy to identify why Gbps rates are
beyond their state-of-the-art grasp: they transmit no
more than ∼1 photon/bit. One justification for this self-
imposed limit is that these systems must defeat the unde-
tectable passive eavesdropper. QKD security analyses af-
∗Electronic address: quntao@mit.edu
ford the eavesdropper (Eve) all things consistent with the
laws of physics. In particular, a passive Eve could replace
the transmissivity κ ≪ 1 optical fiber connecting Alice
and Bob with a lossless long-distance coupler that allows
her to capture and measure a fraction 1 − κ of Alice’s
transmitted light while routing the remaining fraction κ
to Bob without disturbance. With no disturbance of the
light that Bob receives, Eve does not create the telltale
errors that reveal her eavesdropping. In principle, such a
coupler could be constructed to mimic—insofar as Alice
and Bob are concerned—the propagation characteristics
of the fiber that it replaced. Thus Alice and Bob could
not detect Eve’s presence via channel monitoring, e.g.,
with an optical time-domain reflectometer. So, were Al-
ice to ignore the potential presence of the undetectable
passive eavesdropper and make a many-photons-per-bit
BB84 transmission to Bob through this lossy quantum
channel, then Eve could easily obtain a near-perfect mea-
surement of all of Alice’s bits.
We regard secret-key rate, in bits per second, as
QKD systems’ preeminent figure of merit: unless Gbps
rates over metropolitan-area spans can be realized, OTP-
encrypted transmission of large data files will not reach
widespread usage. Existing QKD systems operating
over long–distance connections might be pushed to Gbps
secret-key rates, but doing so would require impracti-
cally large amounts of wavelength-division multiplexing
(WDM). Consider scaling Lucamarini et al.’s BB84 sys-
tem [6] to a 10Gbps source rate achieving a 10Mbps
secret-key rate over a 50 km fiber link. That system
would require 100 WDM channels to yield a 1Gbps
secret-key rate—while 1000 such channels would be
needed at the original source rate—each with its own
2single-photon detection setup. A similar scaling of Huang
et al.’s CV-QKD system [7]—to a 10Gbaud source rate
that achieves 18Mbps secret-key rate over a 50km fiber
link in the asymptotic regime—implies that more than
50 WDM channels would be needed to obtain a 1Gbps
secret-key rate.
In this paper we introduce floodlight quantum key dis-
tribution (FL-QKD), and show that it offers a practi-
cal route to Gbps secret-key rates over metropolitan-area
distances with security against the optimum frequency-
domain collective attack and without the need for mul-
tiplexing. How does FL-QKD realize this extraordinary
secret-key rate? It derives from FL-QKD’s secret-key ef-
ficiency, in bits per channel use, being two order of mag-
nitude higher than those of state-of-the-art systems. In
particular, FL-QKD floods the Alice-to-Bob channel with
broadband light—whose bandwidth is much greater than
the modulation rate—containing many photons per bit.
Its immunity to the undetectable passive-eavesdropping
attack then comes from that high number of transmitted
photons per bit being distributed over a much greater
number of optical modes to make that transmission have
low brightness, i.e., less than one photon per mode.
FL-QKD also employs photon-coincidence channel mon-
itoring on the Alice-to-Bob channel, to ensure security
against the active component of a frequency-domain col-
lective attack, in which Eve can inject her own light into
Bob’s terminal and tries to obtain his bit string from
the modulated version of that light which is contained in
what she taps from the Bob-to-Alice channel. More im-
portantly, we show that FL-QKD can support a 2Gbps
secret-key rate over a 50-km-long fiber link against the
optimum frequency-domain collective attack, and that it
can be implemented with available equipment, i.e., no
new technology need be developed. In short, FL-QKD
opens the possibility for OTP encryption of large data
files for secure transmission over metropolitan-area dis-
tances at Gbps rates.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
Sections II through V present, in succession, a descrip-
tion of the FL-QKD protocol, its security analysis, its
secret-key rate behavior, and some concluding discussion.
For the sake of readability, we have relegated all detailed
analysis to a series of appendices.
II. PROTOCOL DESCRIPTION
Figure 1 shows FL-QKD’s quantum channel setup in
the presence of a frequency-domain collective attack. Al-
ice and Bob use this setup to generate their raw key and
to bound Eve’s Holevo information. Not shown in this
figure is the tamper-proof classical channel that Alice
and Bob use for reconciliation. Neither that procedure
nor FL-QKD’s subsequent privacy amplification step will
be described herein, because they are merely higher rate
versions of standard practice in QKD.
Raw key generation in FL-QKD occurs as follows. Al-
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FIG. 1: (color online). Quantum channel setup for FL-QKD
under frequency-domain collective attack. ASE: amplified
spontaneous emission source. SPDC: spontaneous parametric
downconverter. BPSK: binary phase-shift keying. LO: local
oscillator.
ice sends unmodulated, continuous-wave (cw) light over
optical fiber to Bob, who imposes a random bit string on
that light by means of binary phase-shift keying (BPSK)
at R bps, amplifies the modulated light (to overcome
return-path loss), and returns it to Alice over optical
fiber. FL-QKD’s security against a frequency-domain
collective attack, and its high secret-key rate, come from
the composite nature of Alice’s source plus the data that
Alice and Bob obtain from their channel monitors, which
are used to ensure the integrity of the Alice-to-Bob chan-
nel, i.e, the near-perfect correlation between the light
reaching Bob and the reference retained by Alice. So,
to complete our protocol description, we will character-
ize Alice’s source and Alice and Bob’s channel monitors.
Alice uses an optical amplifier to produce a high-
brightness (≫ 1 photon s−1Hz−1) single spatial-mode
beam of amplified spontaneous emission (ASE) noise
with a W -Hz-bandwidth flat spectrum. She uses a cw
spontaneous parametric downconverter (SPDC) to pro-
duce quadrature-entangled, single spatial-mode signal
and idler beams that have bandwidth W flat spectra,
with the former having the same center frequency as her
ASE source. Alice directs the idler beam to a single-
photon detector that is part of her channel monitor. She
uses a beam combiner to merge a low-brightness (≪ 1
photon s−1Hz−1) portion of her ASE light with her
SPDC’s signal light resulting in an n:1 ASE-to-SPDC-
ratio output with n ≫ 1. She sends a small fraction of
her combined ASE-SPDC light to another single-photon
detector (also part of her channel monitor), and trans-
mits the remaining portion of her ASE-SPDC light to
Bob. Alice stores the high-brightness portion of her ini-
tial ASE light in an optical delay-line fiber (whose delay
matches that of the Alice-to-Bob-to-Alice roundtrip) for
use as the local oscillator (LO) in a broadband homodyne
receiver. She employs optical amplification, as needed, so
that her LO retains its high-brightness character without
appreciable degradation, see App. A.3 for details. Prior
to BPSK modulation, Bob routes a small fraction of the
3light he receives to the single-photon detector that is his
channel monitor.
Alice and Bob use their channel monitors to measure
the singles rates, SI for Alice’s idler beam, SA for Al-
ice’s tap on her transmitted beam, and SB for Bob’s tap
on his received beam. They also use their monitors to
obtain CIA and C˜IA, the time-aligned and time-shifted
coincidence rates between Alice’s idler and the tap on her
transmitted beam, and CIB and C˜IB, the time-aligned
and time-shifted coincidence rates between Alice’s idler
and Bob’s tap on his received beam, in both cases em-
ploying a Tg-duration coincidence gate and accounting
for the relevant propagation delays in the appropriate
manners. From these rates they compute
fE = 1− [CIB − C˜IB]/SB
[CIA − C˜IA]/SA
, (1)
which will be shown below to quantify the integrity of
the Alice-to-Bob channel.
III. SECURITY ANALYSIS
As detailed in App. B, Eve’s general frequency-domain
collective attack is as follows. Eve first establishes lossless
connections between her equipment and the communicat-
ing parties in both the forward (Alice-to-Bob) and back-
ward (Bob-to-Alice) channels. In the forward path, she
performs a general unitary transformation that, during
each of Bob’s bit intervals, acts in an independent, iden-
tically distributed manner on the M = W/R frequency
modes of Alice’s transmitted light. In particular, the
inputs to that unitary transformation are Alice’s trans-
mitted field and Eve’sK vacuum-state ancilla fields. Eve
retains the K ancilla fields that emerge from this unitary
operation and sends the remaining field to Bob. She com-
pletes her attack with a collective measurement on her
stored ancilla fields and the light she taps from the Bob-
to-Alice channel. Here we note, see App. E, that fE is an
intrusion parameter that quantifies Eve’s degradation of
the phase-sensitive cross-covariance between Alice’s idler
and Bob’s received light from what it would be were Eve
only mounting a passive attack. Furthermore, we show in
App. C.2 that Eve’s optimum frequency-domain collec-
tive attack—one that maximizes her Holevo information
for a given photon flux and fE value—is in fact Gaus-
sian and can be realized by her using an SPDC source,
injecting its signal light into Bob through a beam splitter
in the Alice-to-Bob fiber, while retaining her idler for a
collective measurement with the light she taps from the
Alice-to-Bob and Bob-to-Alice fibers, see Fig. 2. For this
optimum attack, fE equals Eve’s injection fraction, viz.,
the fraction of light entering Bob’s terminal that is due
to her [8]. Hence that configuration will be employed
throughout the security analysis below. (Interestingly,
this SPDC beam-splitter attack has the same structure
as the entangling-cloner attack on CV-QKD [9].)
Alice Eve’s
receiver
active Eve
passive Eve
Bob
SPDC
FIG. 2: (color online). Realization of Eve’s optimum
frequency-domain collective attack. SPDC: spontaneous
parametric downconverter. Eve’s SPDC signal beam (shown)
is coupled to Bob through a beam splitter, while her SPDC
idler beam (not shown) is retained for use in her receiver.
We will be concerned with optimized performance for
Alice and Bob against Eve’s optimum frequency-domain
collective attack without regard for finite-key effects.
(For FL-QKD’s ∼Gbps secret-key rates, finite-key ef-
fects become inconsequential for key-generation sessions
as short as a few seconds.) Thus, following standard
practice for assessing security against collective attacks
(see, e.g., [10, 11]), we will find ∆ILBAB , a lower bound on
Alice and Bob’s secret-key rate, from
∆ILBAB = βIAB − χUBEB, (2)
where IAB is Alice and Bob’s Shannon-information rate,
β is Alice and Bob’s reconciliation efficiency, and χUBEB
is an upper bound on Eve’s Holevo-information rate for
her optimum frequency-domain collective attack. Before
doing so, let us provide some simple intuition about how
FL-QKD can be secure against individual passive or ac-
tive attacks.
We will limit our consideration of these individual at-
tacks to low-brightness operation (the ASE-SPDC light
Alice sends to Bob has NS ≪ 1 photon s−1Hz−1) in a
lossy scenario (channel transmissivity κS ≪ 1) with Al-
ice’s source bandwidthW greatly exceeding Bob’s BPSK
modulation rate R. For Eve’s passive attack, we neglect
the small amount of SPDC light in Alice’s transmission
and the small amounts tapped by Alice and Bob for their
channel monitors. Alice’s homodyne receiver and Eve’s
optimum quantum receiver then have error probabilities
satisfying Pr(e)homAlice ∼ exp(−WκSNSGB/RNB)/2 [12]
and Pr(e)passEve ∼ exp(−4WκSN2SGB/RNB)/2 [13], where
GB ≫ 1 and NB ≥ GB − 1 are the gain and ASE
output-noise brightness of Bob’s optical amplifier. Be-
cause ln[Pr(e)homAlice]/ ln[Pr(e)
pass
Eve ] ∼ 1/4NS, we see that
low-brightness (NS ≪ 1) operation affords Alice and
Bob a considerable advantage over Eve. Physically, this
advantage is due to the NS ≪ 1 low-brightness condi-
tion’s making Eve unable to obtain a high-brightness
reference—from the light she taps from the Alice-to-Bob
fiber—with which to detect Bob’s BPSK modulation.
4Later, we will see that this low-brightness condition en-
sures that Eve’s Holevo information rate for her unde-
tectable passive-eavesdropping attack falls far below Al-
ice and Bob’s Shannon information rate. In other words,
as claimed earlier, FL-QKD’s transmitting less than one
photon per mode makes it immune to the attack that
has driven the highest-rate, long-distance QKD system
to limit its transmissions to ∼1 photon/bit.
For Eve’s active attack, we employ the conditions
applied above and, in addition, presume that Al-
ice and Bob’s channel monitors constrain their ad-
versary’s light injection to a small fraction, fE ≪
1, of the light entering Bob’s terminal. The er-
ror probability of Alice’s homodyne receiver will then
obey Pr(e)homAlice ∼ exp(−W (1 − fE)κSNSGB/RNB)/2.
Eve’s optimum quantum receiver—for an individual at-
tack in the Fig. 2 setup using her optimum SPDC-
injection strategy in conjunction with a tap on just
the Bob-to-Alice channel—then has error probability
Pr(e)actEve ∼ exp(−4WfEκSNSGB/RNB)/2. Now we find
that ln[Pr(e)homAlice]/ ln[Pr(e)
act
Eve] ∼ (1− fE)/4fE, which is
highly favorable to Alice and Bob when their channel
monitors limit Eve to fE ≪ 1.
Having provided some individual-attack insights into
FL-QKD’s security, we return to the task of assessing
our protocol’s security analysis when Eve mounts her op-
timum frequency-domain collective attack. To evaluate
Alice’s error probability under that attack, we note the
number of independent modes that contribute to the light
Alice receives from Bob being much greater than one—
for W = 2THz with R ≤ 10Gbps, as we will assume
below, we get M =W/R ≥ 200—justifies a central limit
theorem argument that makes Alice’s error probability
satisfy [14]
Pr(e)homAlice = Q
(
µ0 − µ1
σ0 + σ1
)
, (3)
where µb and σb for b = 0, 1 are the means and standard
deviations of Alice’s homodyne measurement when Bob’s
bit values (phase modulations) are equally likely to be 0
(0 rad phase shift) or 1 (pi rad phase shift), and Q(x) =∫∞
x
dt e−t
2/2/
√
2pi. See App. D for the {µb} and {σb}
with all losses included. With Alice’s error probability in
hand, Alice and Bob’s Shannon-information rate is found
from
IAB = R
[
1 + Pr(e)homAlice log2(Pr(e)
hom
Alice)
+(1− Pr(e)homAlice) log2(1− Pr(e)homAlice)
]
. (4)
Eve’s Holevo-information rate about Bob’s bit string
for her optimum collective attack is
χEB = R
[
S(ρE)−
1∑
b=0
S(ρ
(b)
E )/2
]
, (5)
where S(·) denotes von Neumann entropy. Here, ρ(b)E
is Eve’s conditional joint density operator—when Bob
transmits a single bit with value b = 0 or 1—for the
3M modes available to her that are associated with that
bit, viz., M modes each from her retained idler, the light
she collects from the Alice-to-Bob fiber, and the light
she collects from the Bob-to-Alice fiber. Her uncondi-
tional joint density operator for those 3M modes is then
ρE =
∑1
b=0 ρ
(b)
E /2. The ρ
(b)
E are zero-mean Gaussian
states whose von Neumann entropies are easily found by
symplectic diagonalization [15], as explained in App. C.
The unconditional state, ρE is zero mean but not Gaus-
sian, making its von Neumann entropy quite difficult to
evaluate. However, that state’s covariance matrix is eas-
ily found [16], and we know that S(ρE) ≤ S(ρGaussE ),
where ρGaussE is a zero-mean Gaussian state with the same
covariance matrix as ρE . We can find S(ρ
Gauss
E ) by an-
other symplectic diagonalization and so obtain
χEB ≤ χUBEB = Rmin
[
S(ρGaussE )−
1∑
b=0
S(ρ
(b)
E )/2, 1
]
,
(6)
where we have used S(ρE)−
∑1
b=0 S(ρ
(b)
E )/2 ≤ 1, which
follows from that term’s being Eve’s Holevo information
about a single-bit transmission from Bob.
IV. SECRET-KEY RATES
We are now ready to demonstrate the power of FL-
QKD. Figure 3(a) plots the lower bound from Eq. (2)
on Alice and Bob’s secret-key rate versus one-way path
length when Eve mounts her optimum collective attack,
but Alice and Bob’s channel monitoring ensures that
Eve’s injection fraction into Bob’s terminal is fE = 0.01.
Also shown in that figure is a brightness versus path
length plot for the light Alice sends to Bob. These curves
were obtained assuming that: (1) Alice’s ASE source and
her SPDC signal light have flat spectra with the same
center frequency and W = 2THz bandwidth, and are
combined in an n:1 ratio with n = 99; (2) the bright-
ness of the light Alice sends to Bob and Bob’s bit rate
R ≤ 10Gbps are chosen to maximize their secret-key
rate subject to the constraint that Pr(e)Alice ≤ 0.1 to
ensure the availability of a high-efficiency code for recon-
ciliation [17]; (3) Bob’s amplifier has GB = NB = 10
4;
(4) Eve has replaced the L-km-long, 0.2 dB/km fibers in
the Alice-to-Bob and Bob-to-Alice channels with lossless
fibers and (1− fE)κS and κS transmissivity beam split-
ters, respectively, with κS = 10
−0.02L; (5) Alice taps 1%
of her combined ASE-SPDC light, and Bob taps 1% of
his received light, for channel monitoring; (6) Alice’s ho-
modyne receiver has an undegraded local oscillator with
brightness NLO = 10
4 and efficiency 0.9; (7) β = 0.94;
and (8) the system is otherwise ideal.
We see from Fig. 3(a) that 2Gbps QKD is possible
at 50 km one-way path length when fE = 0.01, and
that this secret-key rate is obtained with NS = 0.043.
(Figure 3(b) shows how this rate degrades as Eve’s in-
jection fraction increases.) Thus, as suggested at the
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FIG. 3: (color online). (a) Lower bound on Alice and Bob’s
secret-key rate and Alice’s optimum signal brightness when
Eve mounts her optimum frequency-domain collective attack
with injection fraction fE = 0.01. (b) Lower bound on Alice
and Bob’s secret-key rate versus fE for a 50-km fiber link with
all other parameters as in (a).
outset, security against a collective attack has been en-
sured by a combination of low-brightness transmission
and coincidence-based channel monitoring. That FL-
QKD has such a high rate after the 10 dB of one-way
propagation loss incurred at 50 km is then due to its use
of an optical bandwidth far in excess of its modulation
rate, which enables Alice to transmit many photons per
bit (ppb) without affording Eve very much information.
This follows from Fig. 4(a), which plots the ppb that
Alice transmits to Bob and the ppb that Bob receives
from Alice. We see that FL-QKD maintains a near-
unity ppb received by Bob for all path lengths less than
200km [18]. The highest rate, long-distance, DV-QKD
demonstration—Lucamarini et al.’s BB84 system [6]—
employs ∼1 transmitted ppb. Hence it cannot match FL-
QKD’s loss-independent ∼1 received ppb performance.
Thus its long-distance secret-key rate is vastly inferior
to FL-QKD’s. Moreover, as noted earlier, an impracti-
cally large amount of WDM would be needed for that
BB84 system to match FL-QKD’s single-channel Gbps
secret-key rate capability over 50 km of fiber.
The story for Huang et al.’s CV-QKD demonstration
[7] is a little different. CV-QKD transmissions are better
quantified in terms of photons per channel use rather
than photons per bit, quantities that are identical for
BB84 systems and for FL-QKD but typically different for
CV-QKD systems. Moreover, CV-QKD systems do not
limit themselves to ∼1 photon/use. Nevertheless, even
scaling it up to a 10Gbaud source rate, Huang et al.’s
system would still require more than 50 WDM channels
to realize a 1Gbps secret-key rate on a 50-km-long link.
We will close our secret-key rate assessment with some
additional comments on its underlying security analysis.
Consider first the optimality of Eve’s using SPDC light
injection in the Fig. 2 setup. For a given value of her
injection fraction, fE , Eve’s use of an SPDC source in
an active attack yields a Holevo information that satu-
rates the entanglement-assisted capacity for the channel
created by her injection, Bob’s BPSK modulation and
optical amplification, and her tap of the Bob-to-Alice
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FIG. 4: (color online). (a) Alice’s transmitted photons per
bit (ppb) and Bob’s received ppb when Eve mounts her
optimum frequency-domain collective attack with injection
fraction fE = 0.01. (b) Upper bounds on Eve’s optimum
frequency-domain collective attack, passive attack, and ac-
tive attack Holevo informations per mode—along with her
entanglement-assisted capacity—as a function of Alice’s sig-
nal brightness, NS , for a 50 km one-way path length assuming
fE = 0.01.
channel. Hence this confirms that no non-Gaussian ac-
tive attack with the same fE can do any better. This
behavior is illustrated in Fig. 4(b), for a 50 km one-
way path length and fE = 0.01, where we have plotted
our upper bound on Eve’s active-attack Holevo informa-
tion per mode versus Alice’s signal brightness, NS , along
with Eve’s entanglement-assisted capacity [19]. Fur-
ther insights from Fig. 4(b) come from its display of
Eve’s passive-attack and optimum frequency-domain col-
lective attack Holevo informations per mode [20]. When
NS ≤ 10−3, the active attack is almost as powerful as
the optimum frequency-domain collective attack, but at
NS ≥ 0.1 the passive attack makes the dominant contri-
bution to the optimum frequency-domain collective at-
tack [21]. These characteristics are easily understood
from the simple, individual-attack error probabilities we
presented earlier. For both passive and fixed-fE active
attacks, Eve’s error probability decreases with increas-
ing NS , but her passive-attack error exponent is pro-
portional to N2S at low brightness, whereas her fixed-fE
active-attack error exponent is proportional to NS. In
future work we will pursue security analysis for coherent
attacks. Because FL-QKD can be regarded as a two-
way CV-QKD protocol that uses discrete modulation,
coherent-attack security analyses for one-way CV-QKD
[22–24] may provide a useful starting point.
V. DISCUSSION
We have argued that a QKD system’s secret-key rate,
in bits per second, is its preeminent figure of merit,
and we have shown that single-channel FL-QKD vastly
outperforms its state-of-the-art competition for long-
distance OTP distribution. To elaborate on why that
is so, let us compare FL-QKD’s secret-key efficiency, in
6bits per channel use, with those of the highest-rate, long-
distance DV-QKD and CV-QKD systems. The secret-
key efficiency of Lucamarini et al.’s DV-QKD system at
50 km is 1Mbps/1Gbps = 10−3 bits/use, while the ex-
trapolated secret-key efficiency for Huang et al.’s CV-
QKD system is 90 kbps/50Mbaud = 1.8× 10−3 bits/use
at that distance. FL-QKD, however, is predicted to have
a secret-key efficiency of 0.2 bits/use at 50 km, two orders
of magnitude better than state-of-the-art performance.
Pirandola et al. [25, 26] have shown that the ultimate
limit for any QKD protocol’s secret-key efficiency, in bits
per mode, is − log2(1 − κS) = 0.152 bits per mode for
a 50-km-long fiber with 0.2 dB/km loss. Because CV-
QKD must mode-match its LO to its signal, CV-QKD’s
secret-key efficiencies in bits per channel use and bits
per mode will coincide. Ideal DV-QKD systems also use
single-mode transmission, in which case their secret-key
efficiencies in bits per channel use and bits per mode will
coincide. FL-QKD, on the other hand, employs many
modes per channel use: at 50km, our 10Gbps modula-
tion rate and 2THz ASE bandwidth imply there are 200
modes per channel use, making FL-QKD’s secret-key ef-
ficiency in bits per mode 0.2 bits/use÷ 200modes/use =
10−3 bits/mode, i.e., on par with Huang et al.’s and Lu-
camarini et al.’s.
Before closing, two additional points need some atten-
tion. Both are related to our use of coincidence-based
channel monitoring—the first concerns what information
that monitoring might reveal to Eve and the second has
to do with preventing Eve from eluding that monitoring
with an intercept-resend attack—and both will be part
of our continuing security analysis for FL-QKD.
In their channel monitoring, Alice and Bob will record
the times at which their monitors have detected pho-
tons. Bob will transmit his detection times to Alice—
over their tamper-proof classical connection—and Alice,
in turn, will merge that data with her own to find the
singles and coincidence rates she needs to determine the
value of Eve’s intrusion parameter, fE . As part of her
frequency-domain collective attack, Eve can listen to Al-
ice and Bob’s classical channel, and use Bob’s photon-
detection information to help her decode Bob’s trans-
mission. The security analysis we have presented thus far
does not account for that possibility. We show, however,
in App. G, that Eve’s Holevo information rate increases
by an inconsequential amount when she pays attention
to Bob’s detection-time data. Indeed, the resolution of
the secret-key rate plot in Fig. 3(a) is insufficient to show
the effect.
Although Eve’s frequency-domain collective attack de-
rives no appreciable benefit from learning the photon-
detection times of Bob’s channel monitor, she could take
an altogether different approach to breaking FL-QKD: an
intercept-resend attack. By detecting the photons that
Alice sends to Bob, Eve could transmit her own light—
with photons concentrated at those detection times—in
the hope that Bob’s channel-monitor data will be in-
distinguishable from what he would get were she not
present. Whether Eve could do so without changing Al-
ice and Bob’s fE measurement is unclear, as is whether
Eve could do so while simultaneously being able to re-
tain a suitable reference beam for decoding Bob’s mes-
sage, but it is important to note that intercept-resend
is not a frequency-domain collective attack, although
security against it would be included were we able to
prove FL-QKD’s security against a general coherent at-
tack. Even without that coherent-attack analysis, Al-
ice and Bob’s can augment their channel monitors to at
least detect an intercept-resend attack—and hence turn it
into a denial-of-service attack—by exploiting the entan-
glement between the signal and idler outputs of Alice’s
SPDC source. Alice and Bob’s coincidence-based chan-
nel monitoring only relies on the photon-paired nature
of those signal and idler beams, which is why Eve could
potentially duplicate that pairing. Entanglement, on the
other hand, cannot be spoofed. So, if Alice and Bob add
either dispersive-optics (frequency-domain coincidence)
measurements (as in [27]), or a Franson interferometer
(as in [10]), to their channel monitors, it will be impossi-
ble for Eve to mount an intercept-resend attack without
being detected.
In conclusion, existing single-channel QKD systems’
secret-key rates at 50 km are so low that their Gbps
WDM versions have overwhelming implementation and
cost issues. With Gbps FL-QKD, however, OTP encryp-
tion of large files becomes practical over metropolitan-
area networks using only a single channel. In this re-
gard we emphasize that FL-QKD needs no new tech-
nology: erbium-doped fiber amplifiers suffice for Alice’s
ASE source and Bob’s amplifier; high-quality SPDC’s
are capable of the brightness that Alice requires; BPSK
modulators capable of 10Gbps rates are readily available;
Alice’s receiver can use commercially available balanced
mixers and need not be shot-noise limited [28]; and Alice
and Bob’s channel monitors can employ available super-
conducting nanowire detectors.
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Appendix A: Alice and Bob’s Terminals
In this section we will detail the equipment that Alice
and Bob use in the FL-QKD setup shown in Fig. 1.
1. Alice’s Transmitter
Alice uses both a spontaneous parametric downcon-
verter (SPDC) and an amplified spontaneous emis-
sion (ASE) source. For each bit interval, the SPDC
7source produces M = TW ≫ 1 signal-idler mode
pairs—where T = 1/R gives the bit duration in terms
of Bob’s modulation rate R, and W is the SPDC’s
phase-matching bandwidth—with annihilation operators
{ (aˆSPDCSm , aˆSPDCIm ) : 1 ≤ m ≤ M }. These SPDC mode
pairs are in independent, identically-distributed, zero-
mean Gaussian pure states that are characterized by the
Wigner covariance matrix
ΛSPDCSI =
1
4
[
ASPDC CSPDC
CSPDC ASPDC
]
, (A1)
where ASPDC = (2NSPDC+1)I2, with I2 being the 2× 2
identity matrix, and
CSPDC =
[
CSPDC 0
0 −CSPDC
]
, (A2)
with NSPDC ≪ 1 and CSPDC = 2
√
NSPDC(NSPDC + 1).
For each bit interval, the ASE source—whose W Hz
bandwidth and center frequency match those of the
SPDC’s signal beam—producesM signal-reference mode
pairs, with annihilation operators { (aˆASESm , aˆASERm ) : 1 ≤
m ≤ M }. These ASE mode pairs are in indepen-
dent, identically-distributed, completely-correlated ther-
mal states that are characterized by the Wigner covari-
ance matrix,
ΛASESR =
1
4
[
AASE CASE
CASE ALO
]
, (A3)
where AASE = (2NASE + 1)I2, CASE = 2
√
NASENLO I2,
and ALO = (2NLO + 1)I2, with NASE = 1≪ NLO,
Alice sends her SPDC’s idler beam to a channel mon-
itor, and combines her SPDC and ASE source’s signal
beams on an asymmetric beam splitter obtaining output
modes,
aˆAm =
√
κC aˆ
SPDC
Sm +
√
1− κC aˆASESm . (A4)
Because she wants each of these modes to have average
photon number NA ≪ 1, and she wants their ASE-to-
SPDC ratio to be n:1 with n ≫ 1, Alice uses κC =
1−nNA/(n+1), and adjusts her downconverter’s pump
power to obtain NSPDC = NA/[n(1−NA)+1]. Note that
for NA ≤ 0.1 and n = 99, these choices imply κC ≥ 0.9.
Alice now directs a fraction κA of her ASE-SPDC sig-
nal light to a channel monitor and sends the remaining
portion to Bob; the latter’s M modes are governed by
annihilation operators
aˆSm =
√
1− κA aˆAm +
√
κA vˆAm , (A5)
where the noise modes {vˆAm} are in their vacuum states.
It follows that the signal modes Alice sends to Bob, her
SPDC idler modes, and her ASE reference modes—i.e.,
the { (aˆSm , aˆSPDCIm , aˆASERm ) : 1 ≤ m ≤ M }—are inde-
pendent, identically-distributed mode triples. Each such
mode triple is in a zero-mean Gaussian state that is com-
pletely characterized by the Wigner covariance matrix
ΛSIR =
1
4
 AS C
′
SPDC C
′
ASE
C′SPDC ASPDC 0
C′ASE 0 ALO
 , (A6)
where AS = (2NS + 1)I2, NS = (1 − κA)NA,
C′SPDC =
√
(1− κA)κC CSPDC, and C′ASE =√
(1− κA)(1 − κC)CASE.
2. Bob’s Terminal
For each bit interval, Bob receives a collection of inde-
pendent, identically-distributed modes with annihilation
operators { aˆ′Sm : 1 ≤ m ≤M}. He first diverts a fraction
κB of each mode to his channel monitor before sending
the remaining light—with annihilation operators
aˆ′′Sm =
√
1− κB aˆ′Sm +
√
κB vˆBm , (A7)
where the noise modes {vˆBm} are in their vacuum
states—to his binary phase-shift keying (BPSK) mod-
ulator. Bob then amplifies the modulated modes with an
erbium-doped fiber amplifier (EDFA) with gain GB and
output ASE NB ≥ GB − 1. The modes that Bob trans-
mits to Alice therefore have photon annihilation opera-
tors
aˆBm = (−1)b
√
GB aˆ
′′
Sm +
√
GB − 1 nˆ†Bm , (A8)
where b = 0 or 1 is Bob’s bit value and the noise modes
{nˆBm} are in independent, identically-distributed ther-
mal states with 〈nˆBm nˆ†Bm〉 = NB/(GB − 1) ≥ 1.
3. Alice’s Receiver
For a bit interval in which Bob has transmitted
the value b, Alice receives a collection of independent,
identically-distributed modes with annihilation opera-
tors { aˆ′Bm : 1 ≤ m ≤ M }. Alice detects them using
a balanced-homodyne arrangement and decides on the
value of Bob’s bit by comparing the outcome of that
Nˆhom =
M∑
m=1
(
aˆ
′†
+maˆ
′
+m − aˆ
′†
−maˆ
′
−m
)
(A9)
measurement with zero. She decides that Bob sent b = 0
if the measurement outcome exceeds zero, and she de-
cides b = 1 otherwise [29]. In this expression,
aˆ′±m =
√
η
(
aˆ′Bm ± aˆ′Rm√
2
)
+
√
1− η vˆ±m , (A10)
where η is the homodyne detector’s efficiency, i.e., the
product of its mode-mixing and quantum efficiencies, and
the noise modes {vˆ±m} are in their vacuum states.
8The reference modes, {aˆRm}, undergo optical amplifi-
cation, with gain GR and output ASE NR = GR, prior
to being stored in a transmissivity-κI fiber spool—whose
length is chosen so that its output will be delay matched
to the light Alice receives from Bob—resulting in
aˆ′Rm =
√
κI
(√
GRaˆRm +
√
GR − 1 nˆ†Rm
)
+
√
1− κI vˆRm ,
(A11)
with the amplifier-noise modes {nˆRm} being in in-
dependent, identically-distributed thermal states with
〈nˆRm nˆ†Rm〉 = NR/(GR − 1) and the loss-noise modes{vˆRm} being in their vacuum states. For NLO ≫ 1
and GR = 1/κI , this amplify-then-store procedure leaves
the average photon number of the reference almost un-
changed and it preserves nearly-complete correlation be-
tween the stored reference and the signal beam that Alice
sent to Bob. In particular, before storage we have that
〈aˆ†Rm aˆRm〉 = NLO, (A12)
and
|〈aˆ†Sm aˆRm〉|2
〈aˆ†Sm aˆSm〉〈aˆ
†
Rm
aˆRm〉
=
(1− κC)NASE
κCNSPDC + (1 − κC)NASE
= n/(n+ 1), (A13)
while after storage we find that
〈aˆ′†Rm aˆ′Rm〉 = κIGRNLO + κINR
= NLO + 1 ≈ NLO, (A14)
and
|〈aˆ†Sm aˆ′Rm〉|2
〈aˆ†Sm aˆSm〉〈aˆ
′†
Rm
aˆ′Rm〉
=
(1− κC)NASENLO
(κCNSPDC + (1− κC)NASE)(NLO + 1)
≈ n/(n+ 1), (A15)
when NLO ≫ 1 [30]. For n = 99, as assumed in the
paper’s secret key-rate calculations, we see that Alice’s
reference suffers almost no degradation.
Appendix B: Eve’s Frequency-Domain Collective
Attack
Figure 5 shows the structure of Eve’s general
frequency-domain collective attack that we will use to
place an upper bound on her Holevo information rate.
Eve has replaced the low-loss (0.2 dB/km) fibers that Al-
ice and Bob presume are connecting their terminals with
lossless fibers. For each of Alice’s M transmitted modes,
{ aˆSm : 1 ≤ m ≤M }, in a bit interval, Eve then performs
the same general unitary operation on K ancilla modes,
{ eˆ(k)Vm : 1 ≤ k ≤ K }, and Alice’s aˆSm , resulting in Bob’s
!"!"!"!"!"!""
#$%&&'"$(%)**$+"
'+$,&-+'+(."
/012"
3#+" /45"6*)%+"
7+(+-$*"&().$-8"
49+-$:4("
aˆSm
aˆIm
eˆ
(1)
Im
eˆ
(2)
Im
eˆ
(K)
Im
aˆ
′
Sm
eˆ
(1)
Vm
eˆ
(2)
Vm
eˆ
(K)
Vm
aˆBm
nˆBm
nˆ
′
Bm
!"!"!"!"!"!""
GB
FIG. 5: Schematic of Eve’s K-mode collective attack used
to upper bound her Holevo information rate. BPSK: binary
phase-shift keying. GB amplifier gain. The dashed wavy line
represents an entanglement that purifies the state of the aˆSm
mode.
receiving the aˆ′Sm mode. Here, without loss of generality,
we will assume that the {eˆ(k)Vm} are in their vacuum states.
For each bit interval, Eve retains the KM ancilla out-
put modes, { eˆ(k)Im : 1 ≤ k ≤ K, 1 ≤ m ≤ M }, from her
unitary operation and the light she taps from the Bob-
to-Alice channel in a quantum memory. At the end of
the key distribution session she then makes a collective
measurement in her attempt to capture all of Bob’s bit
values. Because we will derive only an upper bound on
Eve’s Holevo information rate from this procedure, Fig. 5
shows Eve as taking all the light Bob sends to Alice.
Other concessions to Eve that will be used in obtaining
our upper bound are: (1) Bob will not divert any light to
his channel monitor, i.e., κB = 0; and (2) Bob’s ampli-
fier will have quantum-limited ASE, viz., NB = GB − 1.
All of these conditions increase Eve’s Holevo informa-
tion rate. That said, in practice Eve will not collect all
the light that Bob sends to Alice, Bob will do channel
monitoring (κB > 0), and Bob’s amplifier may not be
quantum limited (NB > GB − 1). Furthermore, in or-
der to minimize Alice’s ability to detect Eve’s presence
by simple photon-flux and spectrum monitoring, Eve will
not inject any of her own light into Alice’s receiver and
she will arrange that the Bob-to-Alice channel still has
transmissivity κS = 10
−0.02L that Alice and Bob expect.
Appendix C: Upper Bound on Eve’s Holevo
Information Rate
Let eˆI denote { eˆ(k)Im : 1 ≤ k ≤ K, 1 ≤ m ≤M } and aˆB
denote { aˆBm : 1 ≤ m ≤ M }. Eve’s Holevo information
rate for her general frequency-domain collective attack is
bounded above by
χEB = R
[
S(ρˆeˆI ,aˆB )−
1∑
b=0
S(ρˆ
(b)
eˆI ,aˆB
)/2
]
, (C1)
9where S(·) denotes von Neumann entropy, ρˆ(b)
eˆI ,aˆB
is the
conditional joint density operator for the eˆI and aˆB
modes given Bob’s bit value, ρˆeˆI ,aˆB =
∑1
b=0 ρˆ
(b)
eˆI ,aˆB
/2 is
their unconditional joint density operator, and the bound
is due to our assuming that Eve captures all the light Bob
sends to Alice.
Before going into details, we place two constraints
on Eve’s attack. First, we assume that Eve precludes
her presence being detected from simple photon-flux and
spectrum monitoring at Bob’s terminal by requiring her
attack to satisfy
〈aˆ′†Sm aˆ′Sm〉 = κSNS , (C2)
where κS = 10
−0.02L is the transmissivity of the L-km-
long connection Alice and Bob believe they have and NS
is the brightness of the light Alice sends to Bob. Second,
Alice and Bob’s channel monitors allow them to measure
Eve’s intrusion parameter, fE , that, as shown in App. E,
measures Eve’s degradation of the phase-sensitive cross
covariance between Alice’s aˆSPDCIm mode and Bob’s aˆ
′
Sm
mode. Because aˆIm is a purification of aˆSm , it follows
that there is a 0 < κ′ < 1 such that
√
κ′ aˆIm has the
same phase-sensitive cross covariance with aˆSm as does
aˆSPDCIm , so we have that
| 〈aˆ′Sm aˆIm〉 |2 = (1− fE)κS | 〈aˆSm aˆIm〉 |2. (C3)
Equations (C2) and (C3) both constrain what Eve’s
general frequency-domain collective attack does to the
Wigner covariance matrix of the (aˆ′Sm , aˆIm) mode pair.
To proceed further, we first introduce aˆI = { aˆIm : 1 ≤
m ≤ M} that purifies aˆS = { aˆSm : 1 ≤ m ≤ M}, i.e.,
the mode pairs { (aˆSm , aˆIm) : 1 ≤ m ≤ M } are in in-
dependent, identically-distributed, zero-mean Gaussian
pure states that are characterized by the Wigner covari-
ance matrix
ΛSI =
1
4
[
AS CS
CS AS
]
, (C4)
where
CS =
[
2
√
NS(NS + 1) 0
0 −2
√
NS(NS + 1)
]
. (C5)
After Eve’s unitary operation, however, the {aˆ′Sm}modes
will, in general, be in non-Gaussian states. Next, we
introduce the complement to the Eq. (A8) input-output
relation for Bob’s amplifier, i.e.,
nˆ′Bm =
√
GB nˆBm + (−1)b
√
GB − 1 aˆ′′Sm , (C6)
with aˆ′′Sm = aˆ
′
Sm
because our upper bound will be
found using κB = 0, and nˆBm in its vacuum state be-
cause that bound will presume Bob’s amplifier is quan-
tum limited. With these assumptions, we have that the
{ aˆI , aˆS , eˆV , nˆB } modes—where eˆV = { eˆ(k)Vm : 1 ≤ k ≤
K, 1 ≤ m ≤M}, and nˆB = { nˆBm : 1 ≤ m ≤M}—are in
a zero-mean Gaussian pure state. It then follows that the
{ aˆI , aˆB, eˆI , nˆ′B } modes—where nˆ′B = { nˆ′Bm : 1 ≤ m ≤
M}—are in a (not necessarily zero-mean Gaussian) pure
state given Bob’s bit value, because Eve and Bob’s op-
erations are unitary. An immediate consequence of this
purity is
S(ρˆ
(b)
eˆI ,aˆB
) = S(ρˆ
(b)
aˆI ,nˆ′B
). (C7)
Moreover, the unitarity of the phase modulation that Bob
performs, given his bit value, implies that these condi-
tional entropies are independent of b. So, because the
mode pairs { aˆIm , nˆ′Bm : 1 ≤ m ≤ M } are in indepen-
dent, identically-distributed states given Bob’s bit value,
we have that
1∑
b=0
S(ρˆ
(b)
aˆI ,nˆ′B
)/2 =MS(ρˆ
(0)
aˆIm ,nˆ
′
Bm
). (C8)
Having obtained a simplified expression for the second
entropy term on the right in (C1), we use the subaddi-
tivity of von Neumann entropy to get
χEB ≤ R
[
S(ρˆeˆI ) + S(ρˆaˆB )−MS(ρˆ(0)aˆIm ,nˆ′Bm )
]
, (C9)
with equality when ρˆeˆI aˆB = ρˆeˆI ⊗ ρˆaˆB . The {eˆI} modes
are independent of Bob’s bit value. Grouping them by
mode index m, i.e., writing {eˆI} = { eˆIm : 1 ≤ m ≤ M }
where eˆIm = { eˆ(k)Im : 1 ≤ k ≤ K }, we have that the {eˆIm}
modes are independent and identically distributed, so
S(ρˆeˆI ) =MS(ρˆeˆIm ). (C10)
Moreover, because Eve’s operation is unitary, the
{eˆIm , aˆIm , aˆ′Sm} modes are in a pure state, so we have
S(ρˆeˆIm ) = S(ρˆaˆIm ,aˆ′Sm
). (C11)
Finally, since we are considering Eve’s frequency-domain
collective attack, the {aˆBm} modes are independent and
identically distributed, thus subadditivity gives us
S(ρˆaˆB ) ≤MS(ρˆaˆBm ). (C12)
Putting the preceding results together gives us an up-
per bound on Eve’s Holevo information rate:
10
χEB ≤ Rmin
{
M
[
S(ρˆaˆBm )− [S(ρˆ
(0)
aˆIm ,nˆ
′
Bm
)− S(ρˆaˆIm ,aˆ′Sm )]
]
, 1
}
, (C13)
where we have used the fact that Eve’s maximum Holevo
information per bit interval is one. Our next step is
to place a lower bound on S(ρˆ
(0)
aˆIm ,nˆ
′
Bm
) − S(ρˆaˆIm ,aˆ′Sm )
by recognizing that term as the entropy output of a
tensor-product quantum channel.
Definition: Entropy output
Let φ(·) be a quantum channel that maps states in H1 to
states in H2. The entropy-output function Eφ(·) of that
channel quantifies the difference between the von Neu-
mann entropies of its output and input states, i.e., for
input-state ρˆ we have that
Eφ(ρˆ) = S[φ(ρˆ)]− S(ρˆ). (C14)
Using this definition (C13) can be rewritten as
χEB ≤ Rmin
{
M [S(ρˆaˆBm )− Eφ(ρˆaˆIm ,aˆ′Sm )], 1
}
. (C15)
Next, we prove that entropy output is superadditive
for the quantum channel φ(·) = φS(·) ⊗ II(·) that maps
the {aˆ′Sm , aˆIm} modes into the {nˆ′Bm , aˆIm} modes, where
II(·) is the identity channel.
Theorem: Superadditivity of entropy output
Let A12 and B12 be bipartite quantum systems on H⊗2A
and H⊗2B with components {A1, A2} and {B1, B2}, re-
spectively. For an arbitrary input state ρˆA12,B12 in
H⊗2A ⊗H⊗2B , and an arbitrary quantum channel φ(·) that
maps states in HA⊗HB into states in H′A⊗H′B we have
that
Eφ⊗φ(ρˆA12,B12) ≥ Eφ(ρˆA1,B1) + Eφ(ρˆA2,B2), (C16)
with equality when ρˆA12,B12 = ρˆA1B1 ⊗ ρˆA2B2 , i.e., en-
tropy output is superadditive.
From entropy output’s definition, Ineq. (C16) is equiva-
lent to
S[φ⊗ φ (ρˆA12,B12)− S(ρˆA12,B12) ≥ S[φ(ρˆA1,B1)]
− S(ρˆA1,B1) + S[φ(ρˆA2,B2)]− S(ρˆA2,B2). (C17)
This inequality can be rewritten as
I(A1B1 :A2B2) ≥ I[φ(A1B1) :φ(A2B2)], (C18)
where I(A :B) = S(ρˆA)+S(ρˆB)−S(ρˆA,B) is the quantum
mutual information. The validity of Ineq. (C18) follows
from the quantum data-processing inequality [31], be-
cause φ(·) acts independently on (A1, B1) and (A2, B2).
The subadditivity of von Neumann entropy and the
superadditivity of entropy output imply that S(ρˆaˆBm )−
Eφ(ρˆaˆIm ,aˆ′Sm
) is subadditive. Moreover, von Neumann
entropy is continuous. So, if we can show that entropy
output for Gaussian channels is invariant under passive
symplectic operations then we could apply Gaussian ex-
tremality [32] and obtain
S(ρˆaˆBm )− Eφ(ρˆaˆIm ,aˆ′Sm ) ≤
SG(ΛB)− [SG(Λ(0)IB′)− SG(ΛIS′)], (C19)
where SG(Λ) denotes the von Neumann entropy of a
Gaussian state with Wigner covariance matrix Λ, and
ΛB, Λ
(0)
IB′ , and ΛIS′ are the Wigner covariance matrices
of ρˆaˆBm , ρˆ
(0)
aˆIm ,nˆ
′
Bm
, and ρˆaˆIm ,aˆ′Sm
, respectively. It would
then follow that, Eve’s Holevo information rate for her
general frequency-domain collective attack satisfies
χEB ≤ Rmin
{
M [SG(ΛB) + SG(ΛIS′)− SG(Λ(0)IB′)], 1
}
,
(C20)
which means that we only need to maximize this rate
when Eve makes a collective frequency-domain Gaussian
attack. Note that ΛB and Λ
(0)
IB′ are obtained from ΛIS′
by applying Bob’s modulator and amplifier transforma-
tions, and that Eqs. (C2) and (C3) place constraints on
ΛIS′ when Eve mounts her frequency-domain collective
attack. The rest of this section is devoted to: (1) proving
that entropy output for Gaussian channels is invariant
under passive symplectic transformations; and (2) plac-
ing an explicit upper bound on Eve’s Holevo information
rate for her optimum frequency-domain collective Gaus-
sian attack under the preceding covariance constraints.
To show that entropy output for Gaussian channels is
invariant under passive symplectic transformations, we
rely on the fact that Gaussian channels and symplectic
transformations are both linear Bogoliubov mode trans-
formations. Also, because the {aˆIm} modes are in Gaus-
sian states, we only need to consider symplectic transfor-
mations of the {aˆ′Sm} modes. Consider a Gaussian chan-
nel φG(·) whose input modes are aˆ1 and aˆ2 and whose
output modes satisfy
bˆ1 = c1aˆ1 + c2aˆ
†
1 + c3nˆ1 + c4nˆ
†
1, (C21)
bˆ2 = c1aˆ2 + c2aˆ
†
2 + c3nˆ2 + c4nˆ
†
2, (C22)
where the {ck} are complex-valued coefficients associated
with φG(·) and the {nˆk} are vacuum-state ancilla modes.
Now suppose that the input modes are applied to the
input ports of a 50–50 beam splitter whose outputs,
aˆ± = (aˆ1 ± aˆ2)/
√
2, (C23)
become the inputs to φG(·). Now the output modes will
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be
bˆ+ = c1aˆ+ + c2aˆ
†
+ + c3nˆ1 + c4nˆ
†
1, (C24)
bˆ− = c1aˆ− + c2aˆ
†
− + c3nˆ2 + c4nˆ
†
2. (C25)
Because unitary operations do not change von Neumann
entropy, we can apply another 50–50 beam splitter to
these output modes and obtain
bˆ′1 = (bˆ+ + bˆ−)/
√
2, (C26)
bˆ′2 = (bˆ+ − bˆ−)/
√
2 (C27)
whose von Neumann entropy will be the same as that of
the {bˆ+, bˆ−} modes. With some algebra, we can verify
that
bˆ′1 = c1aˆ1 + c2aˆ
†
1 + c3nˆ+ + c4nˆ
†
+, (C28)
bˆ′2 = c1aˆ2 + c2aˆ
†
2 + c3nˆ− + c4nˆ
†
−, (C29)
where the nˆ± = (nˆ1± nˆ2)/
√
2 are in their vacuum states.
Hence the {bˆ′1, bˆ′2} modes have the same von Neumann
entropy as {bˆ1, bˆ2} modes. A similar analysis will demon-
strate entropy invariance for waveplate transformations,
completing the proof that the entropy output for Gaus-
sian channels is invariant under passive symplectic trans-
formations.
Having shown the last condition we needed for Gaus-
sian extremality to hold, we turn our attention to Eve’s
collective frequency-domain Gaussian attack. In such an
attack, Eve’s unitary operation in Fig. 5 is a K+1-mode
Bogoliubov transformation [33], resulting in
aˆ′Sm = u0aˆSm+v
∗
0 aˆ
†
Sm
+
K∑
k=1
(ukeˆ
(k)
Vm
+v∗keˆ
(k)†
Vm
)+α. (C30)
A direct consequence of Gaussian extremality is that the
optimum displacement is α = 0, because only when α =
0 will the unconditional state ρˆaˆBm be Gaussian. So,
setting α = 0, we need to maximize the right-hand side
of Ineq. (C20) over the parameters { uk, vk : 0 ≤ k ≤ K}
subject to the following constraints.
First, so that Eq. (C30) yields a proper free-field com-
mutator bracket for aˆ′Sm , we require that the coefficients{ uk, vk : 0 ≤ k ≤ K } satisfy
K∑
k=0
(|uk|2 − |vk|2) = 1. (C31)
Second, the security-monitoring constraint in Eq. (C2)
implies that Eve’s attack parameters { uk, vk : 0 ≤ k ≤
K } must obey
(|u0|2 + |v0|2)NS +
K∑
k=0
|vk|2 = κSNS . (C32)
Because the first term on the left is Alice’s light injec-
tion into Bob while the second terms is due to Eve, the
constraint in Eq. (C3) can be rewritten as
fE =
∑K
k=0 |vk|2
κSNS
, (C33)
which shows that under Eve’s collective frequency-
domain Gaussian attack the intrusion parameter fE
equals the fraction of light entering Bob’s terminal that
is due to Eve. In App. E we will show that Alice and
Bob’s photon-coincidence channel monitoring can mea-
sure fE. Hence Eve will constrain her attack parameters
to yield an fE value that Alice and Bob will tolerate in
the FL-QKD protocol. (Eve’s using an fE value that ex-
ceeds what Alice and Bob will tolerate would constitute
a denial-of-service attack.)
1. Evaluating Eve’s Holevo Information Rate
Upper Bound
We can evaluate the bound in (C20) by symplec-
tic diagonalization of the Wigner covariance matrices of
{ aˆIm , nˆ′Bm}, {aˆIm , aˆ′Sm}, and aˆBm conditioned on the
value of Bob’s bit. From App. B we can easily show
that
ΛIS′ =
1
4
[
AS CIS′
CIS′ BIS′
]
, (C34)
where
BIS′ = 2
[
B +Re(w) Im(w)
Im(w) B − Re(w)
]
, (C35)
and
CIS′ = 2
√
NS(NS + 1)
[
Re(u0 + v0) Im(u0 − v0)
Im(u0 + v0) −Re(u0 − v0)
]
,
(C36)
with B = 1/2 + κSNS , w = v
†u + (2NS + 1)v
∗
0u0,
v† ≡ [ v∗1 v∗2 · · · v∗K ] and u = [ u1 u2 · · · uK ]T and
T denoting transpose. We also find that
Λ
(b)
IB′ =
1
4
[
AS C
(b)
IB′
C
(b)
IB′ BIB′
]
, (C37)
where
BIB′ =
[
B′ +Re(x) −Im(x)
−Im(x) B′ − Re(x)
]
, (C38)
C
(b)
IB′ = (−1)b2
√
(GB − 1)NS(NS + 1)
×
[
Re(u0 + v0) −Im(u0 − v0)
Im(u0 + v0) Re(u0 − v0)
]
, (C39)
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with B′ = 1+2(GB−1)(κSNS+1) and x = 2(GB−1)w.
The last Wigner covariance that we need is
Λ
(b)
B =
1
4
[
B′′ + 2GBRe(w) 2GBIm(w)
2GBIm(w) B
′′ − 2GBRe(w)
]
,
(C40)
where B′′ = −1 + 2GB(κSNS + 1). Because this covari-
ance matrix is independent of b, we have ΛB = Λ
(b)
B and
the unconditional state of aˆBm is Gaussian.
After evaluating all the symplectic eigenvalues of the
preceding Wigner covariances, we have that
χEB ≤ Rmin
{
M
[
g
(
4ξIS′+ − 1
2
)
+ g
(
4ξIS′− − 1
2
)
+ g
(
4ξB − 1
2
)
− g
(
4ξIB′+ − 1
2
)
− g
(
4ξIB′− − 1
2
)]
, 1
}
, (C41)
where g(x) = (x + 1) log2(x + 1) − x log2(x) is the von
Neumann entropy of a thermal state with average pho-
ton number x. Here ξIS′+ ≥ ξIS′− and ξIB′+ ≥ ξIB′−
are, respectively, the symplectic eigenvalues of ΛIS′ and
Λ
(b)
IB′ , and ξB is the symplectic eigenvalue of ΛB.
Because FL-QKD operates with NB ≫ 1, we shall
replace (C41) with its leading-order expansion in that
regime, namely
χEB ≤ Rmin{M [g(2ξIS′+ − 1/2) + g(2ξIS′− − 1/2)
− g(2ξ˜IB′− − 1/2) +O(N−1/2B )
]
, 1
}
, (C42)
where ξIS′± is independent of NB and ξ˜IB′− is the
NB ≫ 1 leading-order, O(1), approximation to ξIB′−.
Our next task is to maximize the right-hand side of
(C42) over all possible values of Eve’s attack parame-
ters, { uk, vk : 0 ≤ k ≤ K }, subject to the commutator-
preservation constraint (C31), the photon-flux constraint
(C32), and the injection-fraction constraint (C33). The
first of these constraints is an absolute requirement on
frequency-domain collective Gaussian attacks, the second
is set by Eve’s desire to elude Bob’s detecting her by sim-
ple photon-flux and spectrum monitoring, and the third
is a consequence of Alice and Bob’s photon-coincidence
monitoring.
The preceding attack-parameter optimization can be
accomplished more readily by satisfying (C31), (C32),
and (C33) by means of
|v0| =
√
(1− fE)κS cos(γv),
with γv ∈ [0, pi/2] and cos2(γv) ≤ fENS/(1− fE)
(C43)
|u0| =
√
(1− fE)κS sin(γv) (C44)
v†v = [fEκSNS − (1− fE)κS cos2(γv)] (C45)
u†u = fEκSNS + 1− (1− fE)κS
+ (1− fE)κS cos2(γv), (C46)
|v†u| =
√
(v†v)(u†u) cos(δ), with δ ∈ [0, pi/2]. (C47)
Next, we further simplify (C42) by restricting it to FL-
QKD’s desired long-distance operating regime, wherein
κS ≪ 1. Here we find that
χEB ≤ Rmin
(
M
{
κS [fENS − (1 − fE) cos2(γv)] sin2(δ)
× {1/ ln(2)− log2[sin2(δ)κS [fENS − (1− fE) cos2(γv)]]}
+ (1− fE)κS log2(1 + 1/NS)[(2NS + 1) cos2(γv) +N2S ]
+ O(κ
3/2
S ) +O(N
−1/2
B )
}
, 1
)
. (C48)
Neglecting the O(·) terms, we find that the derivative
of the right-hand side of (C48) with respect to sin2(δ)
will be positive if ln[2fEκSNS ] < 0, a condition that will
always be satisfied when κSNS ≪ 1. Thus we conclude
that δ = pi/2 is Eve’s best choice. Next, using δ = pi/2
in (C48), neglecting the O(·) terms, and differentiating
(C48)’s right-hand side with respect to cos2(γv), we find
that it will be negative if
ln(2fEκS) < − max
NS≤1
[ln(NS) + (1 + 2NS) ln(1 + 1/NS)]
≈ −2, (C49)
where the NS constraint is due to FL-QKD’s operating
at low brightness. Alice and Bob’s constraining Eve to
fE ≪ 1 combined with κS ≪ 1 ensures that (C49) is
obeyed, making γv = pi/2 optimum.
At this point, using δ = γv = pi/2 in Eqs. (C44)–(C47),
we have that Eve’s optimum frequency-domain collective
Gaussian attack is to use the Fig. 5 setup with
v0 = 0 (C50)
|u0| =
√
(1− fE)κS (C51)
α = 0 (C52)
v†v = fEκSNS (C53)
u†u = fEκSNS + 1− (1 − fE)κS (C54)
v†u = 0. (C55)
Her Holevo information rate for this optimum frequency-
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domain collective Gaussian attack obeys
χEB ≤ χUBEB =
Rmin[M(κSNS{fE[1/ ln(2)− log2(fEκSNS)] +
(1− fE)NS log2(1 + 1/NS)}) , 1] , (C56)
This result omits the O(κ
3/2
S ) and O(N
−1/2
B ) terms in
(C48), so it is important to note that: (1) in computing
the paper’s secret-key rate results we used the exact form
from (C41) with the attack parameters from Eqs. (C50)–
(C55); and (2) numerically maximizing the right-hand
side of (C42) over Eve’s attack parameters for the path
lengths considered in the paper yielded δ = γv = pi/2
[34].
2. Physical Realization of Eve’s Optimum
Frequency-Domain Collective Attack
At this juncture it is instructive to exhibit a physi-
cal implementation for Eve’s optimum frequency-domain
collective attack, namely her Fig. 5 Gaussian attack with
attack parameters given by Eqs. (C50)–(C55). That
attack can be realized with Eve’s using only two an-
cilla and choosing u1 =
√
fEκSNS + 1− (1− fE)κS ,
v1 = 0, u2 = 0, and v2 =
√
fEκSNS . Then, be-
cause Alice and Bob must do phase tracking—FL-QKD
is an interferometric protocol—no loss of generality en-
sues from setting u0 =
√
(1 − fE)κS . With these pa-
rameter values, Eve’s optimum frequency-domain collec-
tive Gaussian attack becomes the SPDC beam-splitter
attack, shown in Fig. 2. Here, Eve uses an SPDC source
identical to Alice’s with the exception of its brightness
being NE = fEκSNS/[1 − (1 − fE)κS ]. She retains her
idler and injects her signal into the Alice-to-Bob channel
through a beam splitter with Alice-to-Bob transmissivity√
(1− fE)κS . Eve then performs a collective measure-
ment on the light she collects from that beam splitter’s
other output port, her retained idler, and the light she
taps from the Bob-to-Alice channel in which she has in-
serted a beam splitter with Bob-to-Alice transmissivity
κS . To see that this identification is correct, we exhibit
its three-mode Bogoliubov transformation,
aˆ′Sm =
√
(1− fE)κS aˆSm
+
√
fEκSNS + 1− (1− fE)κS eˆ(1)Vm
+
√
fEκSNS eˆ
(2)†
Vm
(C57)
eˆ
(1)
Im
=
√
fEκSNS
1− (1− fE)κS eˆ
(1)†
Vm
+
√
fEκSNS + 1− (1− fE)κS
1− (1− fE)κS eˆ
(2)
Vm
(C58)
eˆ
(2)
Im
=
√
1− (1− fE)κS aˆSm
+
√
(1− fE)κS(fEκSNS + 1− (1− fE)κS)
1− (1 − fE)κS eˆ
(1)
Vm
+
√
(1− fE)κS(fEκSNS)
1− (1− fE)κS eˆ
(2)†
Vm
. (C59)
and recognize aˆ′Sm and eˆ
(2)
Im
as the beam splitter outputs
in Fig. 2 and eˆ
(1)
Im
as Eve’s retained idler.
In the paper, we not only report our upper bound
on the Holevo information rate for Eve’s optimum
frequency-domain collective Gaussian attack, as realized
by the SPDC beam-splitter arrangement, but also upper
bounds on her Holevo information rates for her collective
passive and collective active attacks with that arrange-
ment. The upper bound on the Holevo information rate
of Eve’s collective passive attack is trivially obtained from
the development presented earlier in this section: her op-
timum collective frequency-domain Gaussian attack be-
comes her collective passive attack when fE = 0. Eve’s
optimum collective active attack is realized, in the Fig. 2
setup, by her only making a collective measurement on
her retained idler and the light she taps from the Bob-
to-Alice channel. That rate bound, which can be derived
by a procedure similar to what we have just presented,
is as follows:
χUBactEB = Rmin
{
M
[
SG(ΛIB)−
1∑
b=0
SG(Λ
(b)
IB)/2
]
, 1
}
,
(C60)
where
Λ
(b)
IB =
1
4
[
AE C
act(b)
IB
C
act(b)
IB AB
]
, (C61)
with AE = (2NE + 1)I2, AB = [2(GBNS +NB) + 1]I2,
and
C
act(b)
IB =
[
(−1)bCactIB 0
0 (−1)b+1CactIB
]
, (C62)
with CactIB = 2
√
GB(1− fEκS)NE(NE + 1), is the condi-
tional Wigner covariance matrix of the {eˆ(1)Im , aˆBm} mode
pair given Bob’s bit value. That mode pair’s uncondi-
tional Wigner covariance matrix is then
ΛIB =
1∑
b=0
Λ
(b)
IB/2. (C63)
As before, the von Neumann entropies in this bound
can be found in terms of thermal-state von Neumann
entropies via symplectic diagonalization of the Wigner
covariances.
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Appendix D: Alice’s Error Probabilities and Alice
and Bob’s Shannon Information Rates
Because M ≥ 200 for all the performance evaluations
presented in the paper, we can use the Central Limit
Theorem to justify the following Gaussian-approximation
formula for Alice’s error probability [14] when Bob’s bit
value is equally likely to be 0 or 1 and Eve mounts her op-
timum frequency-domain collective Gaussian attack us-
ing the Fig. 2 setup:
Pr(e)homAlice = Q
(
µ0 − µ1
σ0 + σ1
)
, (D1)
where
Q(x) =
∫ ∞
x
dt
e−t
2/2
√
2pi
. (D2)
Here, µb and σb are the conditional mean and conditional
standard deviation of the Nˆhom measurement given the
value of Bob’s message bit, b. Once Alice’s error proba-
bility is found, Alice and Bob’s Shannon-information rate
follows immediately from
IAB = R
[
1 + Pr(e)homAlice log2(Pr(e)
hom
Alice)
+ (1 − Pr(e)homAlice) log2(1 − Pr(e)homAlice)
]
, (D3)
hence all that remains is to determine the conditional
means and standard deviations needed to instantiate our
error-probability formula.
The conditional moments we require are easily calcu-
lated from the Fig. 2 setup and its associated state char-
acterizations, so we will merely present the results. We
have that
µb = 2(−1)bMηκS
√
GBN ′ASENLO, (D4)
and
σb =
√
M{ηN1 + 2η2[NAliceR NLO + κ2SGBN ′ASENLO]},
(D5)
where N ′ASE = (1 − κB)(1 − fE)(1 − κA)(1 − κC)NASE,
N1 = N
Alice
R + NLO, N
Alice
R = κSGB(1 − κB)κSNS +
κSNB, and perfect reference storage has been assumed
[35]. At this point we can obtain the asymptotic (NB ≫
1, NLO ≫ 1) form of Pr(e)homAlice that was used for illustra-
tive purposes in the paper, albeit not in the performance-
evaluation figures. In this asymptotic regime we have
that
σb →
√
2Mη2κSNBNLO, (D6)
whence
Pr(e)homAlice → Q
(√
2MκSGBN ′ASE/NB
)
. (D7)
Neglecting the small amount of SPDC light that Alice
sent to Bob, we can replace (1 − κA)(1 − κC)NASE with
NS . UsingM = TW =W/R, and replacing (1−κB) with
1 because Bob’s channel monitor will withdraw only a
small amount of the light he receives from Alice, we then
get
Pr(e)homAlice → Q
(√
2MκSGB(1 − fE)NS/NB
)
≤ exp(−WGB(1 − fE)NS/RNB)/2, (D8)
in the NB ≫ 1, NLO ≫ 1 regime, where we have used
the well-known bound Q(x) ≤ exp(−x2/2)/2. In the
paper, this expression was quoted for ideal equipment,
which presumes unity homodyne efficiency (η = 1). The
derivation we have just given verifies that in this asymp-
totic regime Pr(e)homAlice is not sensitive to the homodyne
efficiency. Thus the η = 0.9 homodyne efficiency assumed
in the paper is not a critical value.
We have now obtained upper bounds on the Holevo
information rates of Eve’s optimum frequency-domain
collective attack, her collective passive attack, and her
collective active attack, all of which are realizable with
the beam-splitter arrangement shown in Fig. 2. In the
paper we plot upper bounds for these attacks’ Holevo
informations in bits per mode, rather than bits per sec-
ond. The bits per mode bounds are trivially obtained by
dividing the bits per second bounds by the illumination
bandwidth W , which specifies the number of modes per
second that are being employed on the Alice-to-Bob and
Bob-to-Alice channels.
Appendix E: Channel monitoring for general states
Alice and Bob measure the singles rates at their chan-
nel monitors, i.e., SI for Alice’s idler beam, SA for Alice’s
tap on her transmitted beam, and SB for Bob’s tap on
his received beam. They also measure CIA and C˜IA,
the time-aligned and time-shifted coincidence rates be-
tween Alice’s idler and the tap on her transmitted beam,
and CIB and C˜IB, the time-aligned and time-shifted co-
incidence rates between Alice’s idler and Bob’s tap on
his received beam, in both cases after accounting for the
relevant propagation delays as described below. Their
monitors will be assumed to have detectors with quan-
tum efficiencies ηI , ηA and ηB, respectively, and identi-
cal jitter-limited coincidence-gate durations, Tg ∼ 100ps.
When the average number of photons illuminating each
monitor in a gate time is much smaller than one—as will
be the case for our performance evaluation—the average
values of the preceding rates can be taken to be [36]
SK =
ηK
TR
∫ TR/2
−TR/2
dt 〈Eˆmon†K (t)EˆmonK (t)〉, (E1)
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for K = I, A,B, and
CIK =
ηIηK
TR
∫ TR/2
−TR/2
dt
∫ t+Tg/2
t−Tg/2
du
× 〈Eˆmon†I (t)EˆmonI (t)Eˆmon†K (u)EˆmonK (u)〉, (E2)
C˜IK =
ηIηK
TR
∫ TR/2
−TR/2
dt
∫ t+Ts+Tg/2
t+Ts−Tg/2
du
× 〈Eˆmon†I (t)EˆmonI (t)Eˆmon†K (u)EˆmonK (u)〉, (E3)
for K = A,B, where EˆmonK (t), for K = I, A,B, are
the positive-frequency,
√
photons/s-units field operators
entering Alice’s idler and transmitter tap monitors and
Bob’s monitor, respectively. Here, the time-origins for
the {EˆmonK (t)} have been chosen to ensure that true co-
incidences and accidental coincidences will be counted
in the time-aligned coincidences CIK , but only acciden-
tal coincidences will be counted in the time-shifted co-
incidences C˜IK . The latter condition is ensured by tak-
ing the time shift Ts to satisfy WTs ≫ 1, Ts ≫ Tg,
and Ts ≪ TR, where W is Alice’s source bandwidth and
t ∈ [−TR/2, TR/2] is the duration of the FL-QKD pro-
tocol’s quantum communication. In practice, Ts ∼ 10 ns
will suffice for W = 2THz and Tg = 100 ps.
If we assume that Eve mounts a collective frequency-
domain Gaussian attack, then all of the fields appearing
in our singles and coincidence rates are in a zero-mean,
jointly-Gaussian state and we can evaluate these rates
by means of Gaussian moment factoring [37]. However,
because we seek security against the general frequency-
domain collective attack, we will show that Alice and
Bob’s channel monitors can determine Eve’s intrusion pa-
rameter, fE , even when her attack in not Gaussian. To-
ward that end it is convenient to introduce Fourier-series
decompositions for the field operators { EˆmonK (t) : K =
I, A,B } over the entire duration of FL-QKD’s quantum
communication, viz.,
EˆmonI (t) =
e−iωIt√
TR
WTR/2∑
m=−WTR/2
aˆmonIm e
−i2pimt/TR , (E4)
EˆmonK (t) =
e−iωSt√
TR
WTR/2∑
m=−WTR/2
aˆmonKm e
i2pimt/TR , (E5)
forK = A,B, where ωS and ωI are the center frequencies
of Alice’s signal and idler beams and we have limited the
series to Alice’s source bandwidth, i.e., to the frequency
modes that are in non-vacuum states. The behaviors of
the modes appearing in these Fourier series can be gotten
from App. A by presuming that the Fourier expansions in
that appendix were made on the [−TR/2, TR/2] interval
and making the following identifications:
aˆmonIm = aˆ
SPDC
Im (E6)
aˆmonAm =
√
κA aˆAm −
√
1− κA vˆAm (E7)
aˆmonBm =
√
κB aˆ
′
Sm −
√
1− κB vˆBm . (E8)
Note that Eve’s mounting a frequency-domain collec-
tive attack makes the mode triples { (aˆmonIm , aˆmonAm , aˆmonBm ) :−WTR/2 ≤ m ≤ WTR/2 } independent and identically
distributed with the {aˆIm} modes being in zero-mean
states.
For the singles rates we find that
SK =
ηK
TR
WTR/2∑
n=−WTR/2
WTR/2∑
m=−WTR/2
〈aˆmon†Kn aˆmonKm 〉
× sin[pi(n−m)]
pi(n−m) (E9)
=
ηK
TR
WTR/2∑
n=−WTR/2
〈aˆmon†Kn aˆmonKn 〉 (E10)
= ηKW 〈aˆmon†Kn aˆmonKn 〉, (E11)
for K = I, A,B. Using this result in conjunction with
Eqs. (E6)–(E8) then gives us
SI = ηINSPDCW, (E12)
SA = ηAκANAW, (E13)
SB = ηBκBκSNSW. (E14)
Finding the time-aligned and time-shifted coincidence
rates is more complicated than what we have just done
for the singles rates. We start from the photon-flux cross-
correlation function,
RIK(t, u) = 〈Eˆmon†I (t)EˆmonI (t)Eˆmon†K (u)EˆmonK (u)〉,
(E15)
for K = A,B, which, employing the Fourier series given
earlier and grouping terms, can be reduced to
RIK(t, u) =
3∑
k=1
R
(k)
IK(t, u), (E16)
where
R
(1)
IK(t, u) =
1
T 2R
[∑
n,m
〈aˆmon†In aˆ
mon†
Kn
〉〈aˆmonIm aˆmonKm 〉
× ei2pi(n−m)(t−u)/TR
]
, (E17)
R
(2)
IK =
1
T 2R
[∑
n,m
〈aˆmon†In aˆmonIn 〉〈aˆ
mon†
Km
aˆmonKm 〉
]
, (E18)
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and
R
(3)
IK(t, u) =
1
T 2R
{∑
n
[
〈aˆmon†In aˆ
mon†
Kn
aˆmonIn aˆ
mon
Kn 〉 − |〈aˆmonIn aˆmonKn 〉|2
− 〈aˆmon†In aˆmonIn 〉〈aˆ
mon†
Kn
aˆmonKn 〉
]}
, (E19)
because of the independence of the mode triples and the
zero-mean nature of the {aˆmonIm } modes, with all indices
are summed from −WTR/2 to WTR/2.
The time-independence of R
(2)
IK(t, u) and R
(3)
IK(t, u) im-
plies that these terms will not contribute to CIK − C˜IK .
Moreover the independence and identical distribution of
the mode pairs {aˆmonIm , aˆmonAm aˆmonBm } makes R
(1)
IK(t, u) van-
ish when |t− u| ≫ 1/W . Hence we find that
CIK − C˜IK = ηIηK
TR
|〈aˆmonIm aˆmonKm 〉|2
×
∑
n,m
Tg
TR
sin[pi(n−m)Tg/TR]
pi(n−m)Tg/TR . (E20)
In the main text we claimed that Alice and Bob’s chan-
nel monitors will enable them to measure Eve’s intrusion
parameter,
fE ≡ 1−
|〈aˆ′Sm aˆIm〉|2
κS |〈aˆSm aˆIm〉|2
, (E21)
via
fE = 1− [CIB − C˜IB]/SB
[CIA − C˜IA]/SA
. (E22)
Using Eqs. (E13), (E14), and (E20) we get
[CIB − C˜IB ]/SB
[CIA − C˜IA]/SA
=
|〈aˆmonIm aˆmonBm 〉|2
|〈aˆmonIm aˆmonAm 〉|2
〈aˆmon†Am aˆmonAm 〉
〈aˆmon†Bm aˆmonBm 〉
. (E23)
From Eqs. (E6)–(E8) we can reduce this result to
[CIB − C˜IB]/SB
[CIA − C˜IA]/SA
=
|〈aˆSPDCIm aˆ′Sm〉|2
|〈aˆSPDCIm aˆAm〉|2
〈aˆ†Am aˆAm〉
〈aˆ′†Sm aˆ′Sm〉
. (E24)
Use of Eqs. (A5) and (C2) plus 〈aˆSm aˆSPDCIm 〉 =√
κ′〈aˆSm aˆIm〉 then yields
[CIB − C˜IB]/SB
[CIA − C˜IA]/SA
=
|〈aˆ′Sm aˆIm〉|2
κS |〈aˆSm aˆIm〉|2
. (E25)
Although this result appears to verify the agreement of
Eqs. (E21) and (E22), there is an issue with that iden-
tification. The modes appearing in Eq. (E21) were ob-
tained from Fourier-series decompositions of the relevant
continuous-time field operators on a duration-1/R s inter-
val, whereas those in Eq. (E25) come from Fourier-series
decompositions of those field operators on a duration-
TR s interval. Because of the independent, identical dis-
tribution of the mode operators, however, their second
moments—which are all that appears in Eqs. (E21) and
(E22)—will be the same regardless of whether the Fourier
series’ time interval has duration 1/R or TR.
Appendix F: Eve’s Entanglement-Assisted Capacity
When Eve mounts a collective active attack, we can
regard her use of the SPDC’s idler beam she has re-
tained and the modulated, amplified, noisy version of
her SPDC’s signal beam she collects from her tap on the
Bob-to-Alice fiber as an entanglement-assisted communi-
cation channel from Bob to her. Consequently, her col-
lective active attack’s Holevo information per mode can-
not exceed the single-mode entanglement-assisted capac-
ity for that channel, CE [38, 39], because entanglement-
assisted capacity is known to be additive. From [38, 39]
we have that
CE = g[(1− κB)[1− (1− fE)κS ]NE ]
+ g[GB(1− κB)[1− (1 − fE)κS ]NE +NB]
− g[(1 + (1− κB)[1− (1 − fE)κS ]NE)NB ].(F1)
We have been somewhat conservative in Eq. (F1) in that
this result assumes that Alice does not inject any light
into Bob and that Eve collects all the light that Bob sends
on the Bob-to-Alice fiber. Neither of these assumptions
is of great consequence, but they make it easier to obtain
the result in Eq. (F1). In particular, Alice’s injection
into Bob acts as noise for Eve’s active attack. Moreover,
because Alice’s injection into Bob has low brightness, it
is dwarfed by the ASE from Bob’s amplifier. Finally, be-
cause Fig. 4(b) plots CE for a 50-km-long path, Eve is al-
ready getting 90% of the light Bob sends to Alice. Hence
increasing that value to 100% is not a major change, espe-
cially since Bob’s amplifier gain is sufficient to overcome
return-path loss.
Appendix G: Bounding Eve’s information gain from
knowing the output of Bob’s channel monitor
Bob sends Alice the times at which his channel monitor
has detected photons so that she can use that data to
estimate Eve’s intrusion parameter. To do so he uses
a tamper-proof classical channel that Eve can monitor.
So far, we have not included the information that Eve
could glean from that classical transmission in bounding
her Holevo information rate. Here we will show that
the extra information that Eve might gain from knowing
those detection times is inconsequential.
The mean photon-number per bit at Bob’s monitor
detector is MκBκSNS ≃ κB ≪ 1, owing to FL-QKD’s
operating with MκSNS ∼ 1 (∼1 ppb at Bob’s terminal),
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so we will only consider two leading-order possibilities:
no photon is detected (probability of occurrence = p0)
or one photon is detected (probability of occurrence =
p1 = 1− p0).
Let us use χUBEB|n, for n = 0, 1, to denote an up-
per bound on Eve’s Holevo information rate given that
Bob’s monitor has detected n photons and, if there
has been a detection, that Eve knows from which fre-
quency mode it came. (This frequency-mode knowl-
edge is not available to Eve from her eavesdropping on
Bob’s classical-channel transmission, so assuming she has
this knowledge increases her Holevo information rate.)
Then, averaged over Bob’s monitor result, the upper
bound on Eve’s Holevo information rate for her optimum
frequency-domain collective attack is
χ¯UBEB = p0χ
UB
EB|0 + p1χ
UB
EB|1. (G1)
Because all M modes are independent, we have that
χUBEB|0 =Mχ0, where χ0 is the per-mode upper bound on
Eve’s Holevo information rate when Bob’s monitor failed
to detect a photon [40]. When Bob’s monitor does de-
tect a photon, and Eve knows which frequency mode has
lost a photon to that detection, the upper bound on her
conditional Holevo information rate will be
χUBEB|1 = (M − 1)χ0 + χ1, (G2)
where χ1 is the per-mode upper bound when Bob’s mon-
itor detected a photon in that mode. We now have that
χ¯UBEB =Mχ0 + p1(χ1 − χ0), (G3)
which we need to compare to our upper bound from
App. C, which neglected any information Eve might gain
from learning the times at which Bob’s channel monitor
made photon detections.
For χUBEB being the App. C upper bound we will use
χ ≡ χUBEB/M ,to denote its per-mode contribution. We
now have that
χ¯UBEB
χUBEB
=
χ0
χ
+ p1
(χ1 − χ0)
Mχ
. (G4)
Figure 4(a) shows that Bob will receive ∼1 ppb for one-
way path lengths less than 200 km, and our secret-key
rate calculations assume that Bob’s monitor taps 1%
of that light. Together these conditions imply that
p1 ≈ 0.01. Figure 4(a) also implies that Mχ ≈ 0.8
for a 50 km one-way path length. So, taking the very
conservative upper limit of unity for χ1 − χ0, we have
that the second term on the right in Eq. (G4) is at most
0.013. Thus it only remains for us to address the first
term on the right in that equation. We will do so within
the App. C.2 framework, i.e., for Eve’ frequency-domain
collective Gaussian attack.
Eve gains her information from measuring the mode
triples {eˆ(1)Im , eˆ
(2)
Im
, aˆBm}. To assess the impact of Eve’s
having Bob’s channel-monitor data, we focus our atten-
tion on what that data implies about conditional state
of the {aˆ′′Sm} modes, viz., the modes that enter Bob’s
BPSK modulator and, after modulation and subsequent
amplification, become the {aˆBm} modes. Moreover, to
do so we will presume that the {aˆ′Sm} modes that ar-
rive at Bob’s terminal are in independent, identically-
distributed thermal states with average photon number
κSNS , as is the case in Eve’s optimum frequency-domain
Gaussian collective attack. Using the beam-splitter re-
lation that converts these modes and the vacuum-state
{vˆBm} modes into the {aˆmonBm , aˆ′′Sm} mode pairs, we find
that those mode pairs are in independent, identically-
distributed Gaussian states whose coherent-state decom-
position is
ρˆaˆmon
Bm
,aˆ′′
Sm
=
∫
d2α
piκSNS
e−|α|
2/κSNS |√κB α〉BB〈√κB α|
⊗ |√1− κB α〉SS〈
√
1− κB α| . (G5)
Given that Bob’s monitor did not detect a photon, the
{aˆ′′Sm} modes are still independent and identically dis-
tributed, with conditional density operator
ρˆaˆ′′
Sm
|0 =
B〈0| ρˆaˆmon
Bm
,aˆ′′
Sm
|0〉B
Tr
(
B〈0| ρˆaˆmon
Bm
,aˆ′′
Sm
|0〉B
) . (G6)
After some algebra, we have the ρˆaˆ′′
Sm
|0 is a thermal
state whose mean photon number, (1 − κB)κSNS/(1 +
κBκSNS), is less than that mode’s unconditional pho-
ton number, (1 − κB)κSNS . Thus we conclude condi-
tioning on Bob getting no count, the mean photon num-
ber in the return mode decreases, but the quantum state
is still Gaussian. Similar results hold for Eve’s {eˆ(1)Im ,
eˆ
(2)
Im
} modes, and we conclude that χ0/χ < 1, hence
χ¯UBEB/χ
UB
EB < 1.013 at 50 km one-way path length.
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